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ABSTRACT 
WirelessHART is a wireless communication protocol for process automation applications. 
WirelessHART was first introduce in September 2007 by the HART Communication Foundation, 
and the main aim was to add wireless capabilities to the already existing HART technology. 
WirelessHART has five main components namely Gateway, Field device, Network manager, adapter, 
Security Manager, and Router. The WirelessHART protocol was built based on the Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) of seven layers, but the WirelessHART has five layers; Physical, Data-Link, 
Network, Transport, and Application Layer. It employs many processes to ensure data; 
Confidentiality, Authenticity, Integrity, Availability, and Data freshness. 
Key Management is very critical in securing the WirelessHART network. The Security manager is 
responsible for the key management in the network. The Network Manager is responsible for 
assigning and allocating the keys in the network. 
The WirelessHART is not different from attack on any other wireless technologies. Attacks like 
Interference, Jamming, Tampering, Sybil, Collusion, Spoofing, Exhaustion, Wormhole, De-
synchronization, Selective Forwarding, Traffic analysis, Misdirection, Hello flooding and Sinkhole. 
WirelessHART uses the Advance Encryption Standard (AES) to secure the network against attackers. 
The AES is made up of three parts, Cipher, Inverse cipher and key expansion. 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: WirelessHART, HART, Communication, Open system Interconnection,  
   Key management, Security, Encryption, Decryption 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Introduction 
WirelessHART is a HART Communication protocol for automation applications (Raza & Voigt 
2010). The WirelessHART give very strong wireless competences to HART technology and upholds 
compatibility with current HART devices, commands and tools. WirelessHART was primarily 
planned to use mesh network technology, in a mesh network a device can functions as a router for 
messages from the other device. WirelessHART uses IEEE 802.15.4 2.4GHz broadband for data 
transmitting (Raza S. , 2010). 
The WirelessHART application targets sensor and actuators, rotating equipment such as kiln dryers, 
environmental health and safety applications like safety showers, condition monitoring, and flexible 
manufacturing where parts of the plants can be reconfigured for specific product (Mark Nixon, 2012). 
WirelessHART also can group extension to the core HART protocol, thus guaranteeing new devices 
such as vibration monitoring would be fully supported (Mark Nixon, 2012). WirelessHART offers 
protected, dependable and competent communication in process automation industries. 
WirelessHART is a wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) standard in a wireless sensor environment 
(Raza S. , 2010). 
Before the HART communication released the WirelessHART technology, there were technologies 
like ZigBee and Bluetooth were used in office and manufacturing automation (Mark Nixon, 2012). 
These technologies could not meet the strict requirements of industrial control. Both ZigBee and 
Bluetooth cannot be depending on when it comes to end-to-end wireless communication delay (Mark 
Nixon, 2012). ZigBee and Bluetooth do not support frequency hopping. ZigBee network works on 
the same motionless channel throughout its entire lifetime. The use of stationary channel in ZigBee 
networks makes it more helpless to noise and interference, thus making it impossible for ZigBee to 
be viewed as strong enough for a harsh radio frequency environment that frequently occurs in 
industrial applications. ZigBee has low transmission rate, low power wireless with no built-in channel 
hopping technique, while Bluetooth also assumes a quash static network which is not accessible 
enough to be used in a very huge control system (Mark Nixon, 2012).  
The figure below is the protocol stack of HART, WirelessHART, and ZigBee. The protocol stack 
comprises of seven layers and these are: Physical, Data link, Network, Transport, Session, 
Presentation, and application layer 
13 
 
 
 
(Lennvall, Svensson, & Hekland, 2008) 
Figure 1  HART, WirelessHART, and ZigBee protocol stack 
  
  
1.2 ISA100.11a 
Another communication standard that is same as the WirelessHART is the ISA100.11a (Petersen & 
Carlsen, 2011).  The ISA100.11a was released in 2008. The main goal of the ISA100.11a is to provide 
protected and a more dependable wireless communication for static, portable and moving devices for 
non-critical monitoring and control applications (Mark Nixon, 2012). 
What differentiate between the ISA100 and WirelessHART lies in the application layers (Petersen & 
Carlsen, 2011). The ISA100 was intended to take care of handling, in addition to HART commands 
also Fieldbus foundation, Profibus, and Modbus. ISA100 standard possess a management role that 
support management in five areas within the network and across all the architecture. Accounting, 
Configuration, fault, performance, and security are the five management areas. The management 
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service consists of a device management application process that resides on all ISA100.11a and on 
one or more system manager application that resides on a small subset of devices. The design criteria 
of ISA 100 include the following (Mark Nixon, 2012): 
• Flexibility 
• Multiple protocol support 
• Use of open standards 
• Multiple Application support 
• Dependability (error detection, Channel hopping) 
• Determinism (TDMA, QOS support) 
• Security 
 
 
    
                                          Figure 2   ISA100.11a architecture (Mark Nixon, 2012) 
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                                  Figure 3 WirelessHART Architecture (Mark Nixon, 2012) 
 
1.3 Purpose of the Thesis 
The main objective of this thesis work to comprehensively analyze the WirelessHART technology 
and why it is better than other wireless technologies. 
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1.4 Outline of the Thesis work 
An outline of this thesis is given in details as presented below 
Chapter 1 contains the introduction of the thesis work and the purpose of the whole thesis. 
Chapter 2 gives briefs discussion on the Open system Interconnection. In the same chapter the HART 
and WirelessHART technologies are discussed. 
Chapter 3 Key management of the WirelessHART is discussed. 
Chapter 4 discuss all the security concerns of the WirelessHART. 
Chapter 5 present the WirelessHART threat/ attack, where all the security threats are discussed into 
details 
Chapter 6 talks about the cryptographic solution 
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2 CHAPTER 2  
2.1 Open System Interconnection (OSI) Model 
The Open System Interconnection (OSI) model was established in 1940s by the International 
Organization for Standardization (IOS) (Forouzan, 2007). The function of the OSI is to demonstrate 
how to launch communication between different systems without fluctuations to the logic of the 
underlying hardware and software. The Open System Interconnection (OSI), is known not to be a 
protocol, but it is a model for understanding and designing a network architecture that is flexible, 
robust, and interoperable (Forouzan, 2007). The OSI consist of seven layers namely Physical, Data 
link, Network, Transport, Session, Presentation, and Application layers as shown in the figure below. 
          Application 
           Presentation 
           Session 
           Transport 
            Network 
             Data link 
             Physical 
 Table 1 OSI model (Forouzan, 2007) 
HART and WirelessHART 
2.2 Highway Addressable Remote Transducers (HART)  
The highway Addressable Remote Transducer (HART) is a product of the FieldComm group, which 
was first introduced in the 1990s and it has gone on to become an IEC standard (FieldComm Group, 
2018). 
According to the HART Communication Foundation group HART is said to be the biggest digital 
communication technology used in the process industries with more than 400 million field 
instruments supporting the HART technology installed. HART is a global standard for sending and 
receiving digital communication across the 4-20mA analog loop that bridges most of the field 
instruments to the distributed control system (Raza & Voigt, 2010). 
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HART is a two-way communication protocol that allows data access between an intelligent field and 
a host system.  A host system can be in the form of a software application from handheld device, or 
computer to a plant process control, asset management, and safety and from systems that uses control 
platforms. 
2.2.1 Structure of HART protocol 
The HART communication protocol was build based on the Open System Interconnection (OSI) 
(Forouzan, 2007). Unlike the OSI which is made up of seven different layers namely physical, data- 
link, network, transport, session, presentation and the application layers, the HART communication 
has all the layers except for the session and the presentation layers (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
OSI LAYERS                        HART Layers 
Application HART commands 
Presentation  
Session  
Transport End-to-end communication 
Network  Routing 
Data link HART protocol rules. Master-slave protocol 
 Physical Bell 202, AFSK-bus 
Table 2 HART Communication protocol (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012) 
2.2.2.1 Physical Layer (PL) 
The physical layer of the HART communication protocol adopts the frequency shifting key (FSK) 
process to interact with other devices. Analog and digital signals are supported at the same time 
without interference (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
2.2.2.2 Data-Link layer (DLL) 
Data-link layer of the HART communication protocol is in-charge of communications that place 
between devices in the system. In the data-link layer there can be one or two master’s in systems that 
interact with the field device to undertake different task (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). The Data-
link layer is between the physical and network layers. The Data-link layer transfer frames from 
physical layer to the network layer and vice versa. 
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2.2.2.3 Network Layer (NL) 
The network layer of the HART communication protocol is the one that is responsible for the routing, 
data transfer, and for security purposes. This layer also takes care of the source to destination of a 
packet between two systems on the same network (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012).  
2.2.2.4 Transport Layer (TL) 
 HART protocol transport layer is the one responsible for data transporting from one device to 
another. The transport layer makes sure to check the status of the transporting data to make sure they 
arrived at its destination safely and intact (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012).  
2.2.2.5 Application Layer (AL) 
The application layer is responsible for command oriented (read and write), predefined data type, and 
the application procedures. Users get access to service through the application layer. These commands 
are classified as Universal, Common practice, Device specific, and, Device family commands 
(Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
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Universal command Common Practice 
Commands 
Device Specific Commands 
• Read manufacturer 
and device type 
• Read Primary 
Variable (PV) and 
unit 
• Read Current output 
and percentage of 
range 
• Read up to four pre-
defined dynamic 
variables 
• Read or write eight- 
character tag, 16- 
character descriptor 
date 
• Read or write 32-
character message 
• Read device range 
values, units and 
damping time 
constant 
• Read or write final 
assembly number 
• Write polling address 
 
• Read selection of up 
to four dynamic 
variables 
• Write damping time 
constant 
• Write device range 
values 
• Calibrate (set zero, 
set span) 
• Set fixed output 
current 
• Perform self-test 
• Perform master reset 
• Trim PV zero 
• Write PV unit 
• Trim DAC zero and 
gain 
• Write transfer 
function (square 
root/linear) 
• Write sensor serial 
number 
• Read or write 
dynamic variable 
assignment 
 
• Read or write low-
flow cut-off 
• Start, stop, or clear 
totalizer 
• Read or write density 
calibration factor 
• Choose PV (mass, 
flow, or density) 
• Read or write 
material or 
construction 
information 
• Trim sensor 
calibration 
• PID enable 
• Write PID set point 
• Valve 
characterization 
• Valve set point 
• Travel limits 
• User units 
• Local display 
information 
Table 3 HART commands (FieldComm Group, 2018) 
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2.3 HART Packet Structure 
Preamble StartByte Address Command ByteCount Status Payload Checksum 
                            Table 4 HART Packet structure (Lorente, 2015) 
 
 
Preamble: 5-20 bytes with the value of 0xFF (Lorente, 2015). 
StartByte: The type of message determines the value of the StartByte. It can be master to slave. Slave 
to master, it also has the address format, either short or long frame depending on the HART revision 
(Lorente, 2015). 
Address: Two frame types, short and long. For short frame its only one byte and one bit to 
differentiate between the two masters and another bit to point to burst mode packets. With long frame 
format it contains 5bytes and the field device is 38 bits (Lorente, 2015). 
Command: The command field is a 1byte numeric value which encode the master commands. These 
commands are Universal, Common-Practice and the Device-Specific (Lorente, 2015). 
Byte Count: This field tells the length of the message. The receiver can differentiate the payload 
from the checksum. Sum of the status and the payload byte determines the byte amount (Lorente, 
2015). 
Status: Bytes are included in responses from the slaves and it’s also have health status. These bytes 
tell if the communication was a success or failure. If the response is positive these bytes a zeroed on 
the slaves. The masters are not obliged to use these 2 status bytes (Lorente, 2015). 
Payload: Data associated with command. This can also be insignificant depending on the command 
(Lorente, 2015). 
Checksum: It is an XOR of all byte from the start byte to the last byte of the data. It is also known  
as parity (Lorente, 2015). 
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Attributes HART WirelessHART 
Physical layer 4-20mA wiring IEEE 802.15.4-2006 
Data-link Layer Token passing TDMA & FHSS 
Network Layer Undefined Defined 
Application Layer Legacy HART Legacy HART 
Security No Mandatory 
Table 5 Comparison between HART and WirelessHART (Raza & Voigt, 2010) 
 
 
Field Name Length (Bytes) Purpose 
Preamble 5-20 Synchronization and carrier detection 
Start Byte 1 Master Number 
Address 1-5 Slave, Master and Burst Mode 
Command 1 Numerical value of the command to be executed 
Byte Count 1 Data field size 
Status Master (0) Slave (2) Execution and Health reply 
Payload 0-253 Command data 
Checksum 1 XOR of all bytes from start Byte to the last byte of 
data 
                       Table 6 Dissection of a HART packet (Lorente, 2015) 
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2.4 WirelessHART 
WirelessHART is a wireless communication protocol for process automation applications 
(Konovalov, Neander, Gidlund, Österlind, & Voigt, 2011) . 
WirelessHART communication was first introduced by the HART Communication Foundation in 
September 2007 (Song, et al., 2008). WirelessHART add wireless abilities to the HART technology 
and at the same time preserving compatibility with already HART devices, commands, and tools 
(Chen, Nixon, Han, Mok, & Zhu, 2014). 
The WirelessHART was built to use mesh network technology. A device can be used as a router to 
receive or send message from other devices (FieldComm Group, 2018). WirelessHART has five main 
components namely Gateway, field device, network manager, adapter, security manager, and a router. 
2.4.1 Field Device (FD) 
 The field device is a sensing device that is used for sensing functions. These devices which are 
movable devices for example phone, laptops and any other communication has in them an in-built 
WirelessHART communication features making it possible for devices to interconnect with each 
other (Petersen & Carlsen, 2011). 
2.4.2 Access Point (AP) 
When the gateway wants to have communication with the wireless devices it must seek access 
permission from the access point (Petersen & Carlsen, 2011). 
2.4.3 Gateway  
The gateways give communication access to the devices and the host applications. It is an access 
point where the WirelessHART network and the automation network are connected and allowing data 
to be transferred between them (Petersen & Carlsen, 2011). 
2.4.4 Adapter 
 The main responsibilities of the adapters are to connect the already wired HART devices to the 
WirelessHART devices (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
2.4.5 Network Manager (NM) 
 The network manager of the WirelessHART is the one responsible for managing all the network 
configurations, scheduling the communications between devices, managing the messages routes and 
checking the network health. The network manager can be an in-built into the gateway, host 
application or the automation controller (FieldComm Group, 2018). 
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2.4.6 Security Manager 
 The security manager is responsible for making sure they give strong security and protection 
communication to the wired part in the WirelessHART network against attackers (Raza S. , 2010). 
2.4.7 Routers 
 The routers give all the devices the capabilities to routes in the WirelessHART (Mark Nixon, 2012). 
2.4.8 Handheld 
They are WirelessHART devices which plant engineers and other field workers used on the field, 
which are connected to field devices. Sometimes they serve as monitoring devices or writing join 
key, configuration, diagnostic, and calibration (Mark Nixon, 2012). 
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                                     Figure 4  connected WirelessHART devices (Mark Nixon, 2012) 
2.5 Structure of WirelessHART Protocol 
The table below shows the architecture of the WirelessHART protocol. The WirelessHART protocol 
is like that of the HART protocol was build based on the Open System interconnection (OSI) of seven 
layers. The fig below shows the WirelessHART protocol stack with five layers namely physical, data-
link, network, transport, and the application layers. 
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                       Application Layers 
                      Transport Layers 
                       Network Layers 
                       Data-Link Layer 
                       Physical Layer 
                              Table 7 WirelessHART communication protocol (Forouzan, 2007) 
2.5.1 Physical Layers 
The physical layer of the WirelessHART was build based on the IEEE802.15.4-2006 2.4GHz DSSS 
physical layers. Radio characteristics like signaling methods, signaling strength and device sensitivity 
are define on this layer (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). Quadrature Phase shift key (QPSK) is the 
modulation used by the physical layer of the WirelessHART. Bits are modified into wireless signals 
and sends to other layers at 2.4GHz frequency (Raza S. , 2010). 
2.5.2 Data-Link Layers (DLL) 
 The WirelessHART Data-Link Layer (DLL) is also based on IEEE802.15.4-2006 MAC. The DLL 
prolong the working of the MAC by defining a fixed 10ms time slot. This time slots are well managed 
by what is known as super frames, that groups a sequence of successive time slots. A super frame is 
known to be periodic. In WirelessHART network all super frames begins with absolution slot number 
(ASN) 0; which represent the time when the first network was created (Mark Nixon, 2012). The main 
function of the Data-link layer of WirelessHART for radio synchronization (Petersen & Carlsen, 
2011).  It also functions as the one that send and receive frames with other radio devices. The Data-
Link Layer (DLL) is divided into two, Logical link control (LLC) and Medium access control (MAC). 
The data-link layer is in-charge of secure, more reliable, and error free communication of data 
between HART compatible devices (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
2.5.3 Network Layer (NL) 
The network layer of the WirelessHART has many functions, but the most important of them are 
routing and security. In the Data link layer (DLL) packet are moved between devices, where as in the 
network layer packets are moved end-to-end within the wireless network. The network layer has 
features like route table and time table. The route table is for route communication along a graph 
whiles the time table for assigning communication bandwidth to some service like publishing data 
and transmitting block of data (Mark Nixon, 2012). The layer takes care of routing packet from the 
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initial source to their destination (Petersen & Carlsen, 2011). There are two types of routing supported 
here, the graph and the source routing and all devices must support both routing. A graph is made up 
of path that are connected to network nodes. These paths are created by the network manager and 
then downloaded to the individual devices. For packet to be send successfully the source device must 
write a specific graph ID in the network header (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
2.5.4 Transport Layer (TL) 
The transport layer (TL) of the WirelessHART main function is the block data transfer mechanism. 
The transport layer set up communication between the host application and the field device (Kim, 
Hekland, Petersen, & Doyle, 2008). The layer also provides end-to-end acknowledgment 
communication. HART command is used by the host application for configuring the slave device, by 
opening a port on board of the device. Another function of the transport layer is to constantly check 
the neighboring devices. These devices listen for new neighbors and give information if they come 
across a new neighbor. The devices keep information on communication with other devices like 
received signal level and packet count (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
2.5.5 Application Layer (AL) 
 In the WirelessHART, the application layer is said to be the highest of all the layers in the 
architecture. The WirelessHART uses the same standard as the HART application layer which is a 
command based (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). The application layer also describes various 
commands, responses, data type, and status reporting (Song, et al., 2008). 
In the application layer all communication between devices are through a set of define commands, 
which are divided into groups namely universal commands, common practice commands, device 
families’ commands, and device specific commands (Petersen & Carlsen, 2011). The main function 
of the Application layer is for analyzing the message content, extracting the command number 
executing the specified command and generating responses (Song, et al., 2008). 
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Figure 5 Dissection of a WirelessHART packet at different layers (Lorente, 2015)  
 
Transport 
Control 
Device 
Status 
Extended Device 
Status 
TPDU 
Payload 
Preamble Delimiter Length PPDU Payload 
29 
 
 
3    CHAPTER 3 
3.1  Key Management in Wireless HART 
In every communication network keying management plays very important role when it comes to 
security. Due to power limited device of public key infrastructure (PKI) are not used (Lorente, 2015). 
When it comes to protection of WirelessHART network, it is required that both wireless and wired 
devices are very important. 
3.1.1 Join key 
In wireless HART join key is regarded as the most important key. This join key is an unknown and 
phase shifting key (PSK) is used to authenticate with the network manager (Lorente, 2015). This is a 
key which is put into a device by a handheld device which is connected to the network. The join key 
is also said to act as a password that the device used to verify it to the network manager (Raza S. , 
Voigt, Slabbert, & Landernas, 2009). The join key (JK) provides an end-to-end security between a 
device and the network manager (NM) (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). The join key is used only 
when the joining process and both the join request and response are encrypted with such key at the 
network layer (Lorente, 2015). At the network layer level, the join key function as a tool to encrypt 
the payload and calculate the MIC (Raza, Voigt & Landernas (2009). The network manager (NM) 
has the mandate to verify the device by its join key and then write back the network key and the 
session key into the device, when the device is being connected for the first time (Madduri & 
Jonnalagadda 2012). The network manager can change the join key of the device immediately they 
are found to become part of the network. According to the HART Communication foundation; 
• The join key serves as authentication to the security manager that the device belongs to this 
network 
• The join key treated separately from the other keys to enhance security. 
• Join keys can either be unique to each device, or be common to a given WirelessHART 
network based on the user security policies 
• Join keys can be changed after the device join the network to further increase security 
3.1.2 Session Key 
The session keys are used by the network layer to provide end-to-end communication between two 
devices on a network (Petersen & Carlsen 2011). In this session four session keys needs to be 
established and these keys are as follows: 
• Unicast Network Manager Key (UNMK) 
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• Unicast Gateway Key (UGWK) 
• Broadcast Network Manager Key (BNMK) 
• Broadcast Gateway Key (BGWK) 
Unicast Network Manager Key (UNKM) 
The unicast network manager key is used to provide an end-to-end encryption between the network 
manager and the wireless nodes in the network (Lorente, 2015). The network manager and the 
wireless nodes uses this key to interact in the network. This key is used by the network manager for 
device management, example asking about device health information, time slots allocation and 
renewing the join key when needed 
Unicast Gateway Key (UGWK) 
The unicast gateway key provides a very secured end-to-end interaction between the gateway and the 
field device or between two field devices (Lorente, 2015). The Gateway has session with all the field 
devices, and two field devices should communicate through it. The UGWK also function as securing 
the NPDU payload and calculate the MIC at the network layer. 
Broadcast Network Manager Key (BNMK) 
This key is used for sending global secure messages into the wireless network between the network 
manager, wireless devices and the Gateway. Some of these messages includes routing information, 
scheduling in network, and many others. This key can also be used to change the network key (Raza 
S. , Voigt, Slabbert, & Landernas, 2009). 
Broadcast Gateway Key (BGWK)  
The BGWK is the key used to send broadcast messages from the gateway to the field devices for 
examples notifications or timing amongst others (Lorente, 2015). 
3.1.3 Network Key (NK) 
The network key is the key that is initiated by the security manager and after some time disseminate 
to all the devices in the wireless sensor network (WSN) by the network manager. The Datalink layer 
(DLL) uses this key to validate messages on a one-hop basis (Petersen & Carlsen, 2011). This key is 
rotated from time to time because of the security arrangement of the process automation plant. The 
network key also provide security against attacks from outsiders. The network key is used to calculate 
the keyed MIC to secure the datalink PDU. The network key is used by two devices to authenticate 
each other at the datalink layer, and by making sure the calculated MIC is verified using AES-128 
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CBC-MAC (Lorente, 2015). The network key is used by the network manager for broadcast session 
and key renewal. This key is also known is some papers as “Link key”. 
3.1.4 Handheld Key 
 Handheld key is used for peer-to peer wireless communication between a handheld device connected 
to a field device without the use of the gateway. Before a handheld device connected to a field device 
get connected to the network and its devices, it must make use of the join key (Madduri & 
Jonnalagadda 2012). After making sure it has been validated by the network manager, using the join 
key, a handheld device can move on to request for a handheld key. The network manager accepts this 
request and then grant both the hand-held device and field device the key (Raza S. , Voigt, Slabbert, 
& Landernas, 2009). 
For the handheld device to establish connection with the field devices an AFSK modem needs to be 
used. The handheld key is used to provide security to the NPDU. 
3.1.5 Well-Known Key 
The well-known key is a coded key in the WirelessHART, which is the same always. This key is 
given to a device upon joining the network without a network key and in other to protect the datalink 
layer PDU. The well-known key (WKK) 777 772E 6861 7274 636F 6D6D 2E6F 7267 which happens 
to be the ASCII translation of: “ www.hartcomm.org” (Lorente, 2015). This well-known key is used 
to calculate the MIC for the join request and response messages (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
3.2 Key Management 
In WirelessHART network, keys are very important since they provide the needed security to the 
network. The security manager in the WirelessHART network are responsible for the key 
management in the network. The network manager in-charge of assigning and allocating the keys in 
the network. 
3.2.1 Key Generation 
 In WirelessHART network key generation does not follow any required format. The security 
manager is the one in-charge of the generation of the keys and the network manager on the other 
hands is responsible for providing the needed password that needs to be authenticated. AES is used 
for the key generation and the logic for generating various keys depends on the security (Madduri & 
Jonnalagadda 2012). 
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                                          Figure 6 Key Generation Process (Raza S. , 2010) 
3.2.2 Key Request 
In the key request process the Network Manager (NM) depends on the Security manager for all the 
key but not the Well-Known key. The Network Manager needs Unicast and Broadcast session keys 
to decrypt the Network Protocol Data Unit (NPDU) message from both devices and Gateway (Raza 
S. , 2010). The key request process starts with the Network manager sending request message to the 
Security Manager. The security manager grants this request by releasing Handheld, Network, and 
Gateway sessions and are later spread to the appropriate devices to empower wireless communication 
(Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012).  The key request process is explained in the figure below. 
33 
 
 
           
 
          Figure 7 Key request process (Raza 2010) 
3.2.3 Key Storage 
 The security manager is the one in-charge of making sure all the keys are safely stored in the network. 
All the keys are placed in a safe storage which has a security password. These passwords are kept 
safe by the security administrator. The network manager or the security manager are the ones 
responsible for managing the password in the storage. In the key database all the generated keys are 
stored by the security managers and its key related information like Network ID, Nickname, Device 
address, Device identity, key type, Status, Generation date, and Expiry date. All information in the 
database are stored as plain text but at the same time the database can be secured with password. 
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Network ID 
Network ID is very important and thus WirelessHART network are identified by a unique ID. A 
security manager can serve more than one WirelessHART network and therefore it’s very important 
to know which network has been served at a time, hence the importance of the Network ID in 
identifying them. 
Nickname 
 A nickname is given to all device that join the network by the network manager. This network 
manager gives nickname to all the verified WirelessHART devices. All key request except the join 
key contains this parameter (Raza S. , Voigt, Slabbert, & Landernas, 2009) 
Key Type 
The key type is the name of the key requested at a time. The key type can be Join key, Unicast-
Gateway key, Unicast network key, Broadcast Gateway key, Broadcast network manager key, 
Handheld key, and Network key (Raza S. , Voigt, Slabbert, & Landernas, 2009). 
Device Address 
 When a device joins the network and has no Nickname it is regarded as not been part of the network. 
The network manager then assigns it an address, which is used to identify this device (Madduri & 
Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
Device Identity 
 The device identity is the response to WirelessHART command 0 (read unique identifier) or 
command 20 (Read long tag). When the device successfully joins the network this device identity is 
used to authenticate it (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
Status: The status indicates if a device is still part of the network or not part of the network. 
3.2.4 Key Distribution 
This is a process where the network manager distributes the keys to the device on the network and 
the key to the wireless network. The table below represents the commands used in management of 
the Keys. 
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WirelessHART Keys Commands 
Session key Command 963 (Write session) 
Network Key  Command 961 (Write network key) 
Hand-held key Command 823(Request session) 
Join Key Command 768 (Write join Key) 
      Table 8 Key distribution Commands (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012) 
3.2.5 Key Renewal 
 Key renewal in WirelessHART is done often because of the possible security breached or brute – 
force attack. In the WirelessHART network all keys are subjected to renewal except for the Well-
known key (Raza S. , 2010). The system administrator (SA) is the one who request for the key renewal 
(only for the join key), security manager (SM) for key expiration or by the network manager (NM). 
When the system administrator or the system manager make request for key renewal the Network 
manager is made aware of such request. Without a renewal request from the network manager, the 
system manager will not change the key. The system manager will go on to change the key only it 
receives information from the network manager. The network manager on the other hand must write 
the change into the main device since the system manager is not in the position to make session with 
the field device and the Gateway (Raza S. , 2010). When the network manager gets a key renewal 
request or need to change keys itself, it asks the system manager to change the key. The system 
manager makes sure this request is authentic and if it verifies it is genuine, then it goes ahead to make 
the changes to the key and then sends back the new key to the network manager and the network 
manager sends it to the wireless device or the gateway (Raza S. , Voigt, Slabbert, & Landernas, 2009).  
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                                    Figure 8 Key 8 renewal process (Raza 2010) 
3.2.6 Key Revocation 
 Key revocation is the process of deactivating or deleting a key from the secure storage and other 
related information from the key database (Raza S. , 2010). When a device is no longer part of the 
network the network manager initiates the key revocation process for it to be deactivated or deleted 
from the secure storage. In the key revocation process parameters like Network ID, Nickname, and 
key types are deleted (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). The security manager deletes the keys and 
sends a feedback message if it was successful or failure. If a device leaves the network, all related 
features to it are deleted, but when Hand-held-to-field device (peer-to-peer) session expires only the 
Hand-held key is deactivated (Raza S. , 2010). 
3.2.7 Key Vetting 
 Key vetting is the process to make sure the keys are verified and authenticated to be part of the 
network. In this process the device status is checked, and information sent to the main control system 
(Raza S. , 2010). 
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3.3 WirelessHART key Management challenges 
Key Management in wireless network comes with lot of challenges. WirelessHART key management 
also has shortcomings.  The table below shows the key management in the wireless devices. 
Key Management WirelessHART  
Solution 
Comments 
Key Generation No Not defined 
Key Storage No Not defined 
Key Distribution Limited Key distribution from the Network Manager (NM) to the 
devices is defined but the key distribution from the Security 
Manager to the Network Manager not defined. Join Key 
distribution not defined 
Key Renewal Limited Though solutions to how key renewals are provided by 
WirelessHART, no information is given on how the key are 
renewed in the security manager. 
Key Revoking No Not defined 
Key Vetting No Not defined 
              Table 9  Key Management in Wireless part of WirelessHART (Raza S. , 2010). 
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4 CHAPTER 4 
4.1 WirelessHART Security 
WirelessHART was built on the mesh networking technology and at the same time possess some 
features of wireless sensor networks as all the field devices are enable with one or more sensors. 
WirelessHART security requirement s are combination of both mesh network and the wireless sensor 
network. WirelessHART uses very strong security measures to protect the network and secure data 
at all times. WirelessHART implement many processes to ensure data confidentiality, authenticity 
and integrity in both hop-by-hop and end-to-end transmissions (Bayou, Espes, Cuppens-Boulahia, & 
Cuppens, 2016). IEC has approved WirelessHART standard for industrial process automation and 
control. WirelessHART is a secure and reliable protocol for the process automation. According to the 
HART Communication Foundation security automatically protects valuable information 
(FieldComm Group, 2018): 
➢ Robust, multi-tiered, always-on security 
➢ Industry standard 128-bit AES encryption 
➢ Unique encryption key for each message 
➢ Data integrity and device authentication 
➢ Rotate encryption keys used to join the network automatic or on-demand 
Protect Wireless Network (FieldComm Group, 2018): 
➢ Channel hopping for security protection and co-existence 
➢ Multiple levels of security keys for access 
➢ Indication of failed access attempts, perhaps by rogue demands 
➢ Reports message integrity and authentication failures 
➢ Safe from Wi-Fi type internet attacks 
Security Requirements 
For any network to be successfully secured against attacks, some certain security features 
must be met before. For WirelessHART to be successfully secured from attacks all these 
features must be met. Some of these security features to be discussed in this thesis work 
includes Authentication, confidentiality, integrity, availability, data freshness and time 
synchronization. 
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• Authentication: Authentication is a state where all nodes within the WirelessHART 
network are verified and their identities known to all. Authentication helps in 
identifying the source of data and then reassures other participants on the network that 
data being received or transmitted is sent from or delivered to the right target (Messai, 
2014). 
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality is very important when it comes to data security. 
Wireless data transmission has a high risk of been attacked because of their mode of 
transmission. Wireless information can easily be captured by people with highly 
sophisticated equipment when the confidentiality agreement is breached (Messai, 
2014).  Confidentiality of any message within the WirelessHART network is not 
guaranteed without security. Confidentiality protect the privacy and integrity of the 
information being transferred over the network. 
• Integrity: Integrity determines the originality of data sent or received. Integrity of data 
ensures that data transmitted between communicating nodes within a network remains 
the same, (Murty et al. 2010). Some area of application of WirelessHART sensor 
network deals with financial institutions, health organizations, military intelligence 
etc., so the integrity of data sent and received on the network very importance (Messai, 
2014). Any changes in such data could result in bad consequence. 
• Availability: Availability, deals with maintain the functionality of the network in a 
situation of internal or external attacks (intentional or unintentional). The main duties 
of the WirelessHART sensor network (WSN) is to collect and transmit data wirelessly 
to it target destination (Messai, 2014). When there is no data available to be 
transmitted this purpose comes to an end. Another important application that uses 
WSN is collection of data for successful prediction of change that could have an 
impact on the health of an individual. An example is the collection of data for a disease 
outbreak, if data availability were to be tempered with within the network it could lead 
to wrong medication administered which could lead deformity or loss of lives 
• Data freshness: Data freshness deals with data that are current. One of the 
requirements of the WSN is its ability to provide the network a fresh data. When an 
attacker attacks the network and decides to circulate old data within the network, 
which could be mistaken as currently received data at the collection center. Situation 
like this create difficult situation for data analyst whose judgement on the received 
data could be different from the current situation at the physical location. 
40 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Security policy and why the need for it 
A good security policy is a way of building a very strong and successful implementation of security 
related issues in the future; this is without doubt the first step that must be taken to reduce the risk of 
unwanted use of any of the company’s information resources (. The first step in making sure 
company’s security issues are kept intact is to introduce security policies, give training to staff on the 
various aspect of their responsibilities, general use of the company resources and explains how staff 
can handle sensitive company information (Brotby, 2006). The policy will also describe in detail in 
the meaning of acceptable use, as well as listing unaccepted events. A WirelessHART Security Policy 
is a well-defined and documented set of guidelines that describes how an organization manages, 
protects its information assets and makes future decisions about its information systems security 
infrastructure (Bowen, Hash, & Wilson, 2007). The development (and the proper implementation) of 
a security policy is highly beneficial as it will not only turn all your staff into participants in the 
company's effort to secure its communications but also help reduce the risk of a potential security 
breach through "human-factor" mistakes. There are usually issues such as revealing information to 
unknown (or unauthorized sources), the insecure or improper use of the Internet and many other 
dangerous activities. Additionally, the building process of a security policy will also help define a 
company's critical assets, the ways they must be protected and will also serve as a centralized 
document, as far as protecting Information Security assets is concerned (Bowen, Hash, & Wilson, 
2007). 
4.2.1 Purpose of Security Policy 
❖ To launch a general method to information security 
❖ To notice and envision the compromise of information security such as misuse of data, 
network, computer systems and applications. 
❖ To protect the reputation of the company with respect to its ethical and legal responsibilities. 
❖ How to properly maintain your ID(s) and password(s), as well as any other accounting data 
❖ How to responds to a potentially security incident, intrusion attempt. 
❖ How to properly use the corporate e-mail system 
❖ How to use work station and internet connectivity in a secure manner 
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4.3 Risk Management 
  An effective risk management procedure is a vital component of a successful information security 
program (Bowen, Hash, & Wilson, 2007). The main objective of an organization’s risk management 
procedure is to protect the organization and its capacity to accomplish its mission, not just its 
information assets. Therefore, the risk management procedure should not be treated mainly as 
function carried out by the security experts who operate and manage the security system, but as an 
important management function of the organization that is firmly interlaced into the system 
development life cycle (Bowen, Hash, & Wilson, 2007). Because risk cannot be eliminated entirely, 
the risk management process allows security program managers to balance the operational and 
economic cost of protective measures and achieve gains in mission capability. To manage and 
mitigate risk and reduce potential impacts on information assets to an acceptable level, consider the 
following goals: 
 
▪ Account for and protect all IT assets 
▪ Create and reduce the possibility and influence of IT security risk 
▪ Do systematic risk assessment with senior managers and key staff members. 
▪ Permit access to critical and sensitive data only to authorized users 
▪ Safeguard serious and confidential information is withheld from those who should 
not have access to it 
▪ Identify, monitor and report security weaknesses and incidents 
▪ Develop IT continuity plans that can be implemented and are tested and maintained 
4.4 Risk Assessment 
According to the Hart Communication foundation to be a credible threat, an attacker must require 
access, technical know-how and motivation to attack (FieldComm Group, 2018). The goal of risk 
assessment process is to identify and assess to a given environment (Bowen, Hash, & Wilson, 2007). 
The depth of the risk assessment performed can vary greatly and is determined by the critically and 
sensitivity of the system, as applied to confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Bowen, Hash, & 
Wilson, 2007). According to the HART Communication Foundation the WirelessHART security 
architecture helps users to address three very important areas (FieldComm Group, 2018): 
• Minimize, control and audit access 
• Need high level of technical proficiency to disrupt 
• Reduce the span and duration of any individual security breach 
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 Figure 9 Risk assessment process (Bowen, Hash, & Wilson, 2007) 
4.5 Risk Mitigation 
Another phase of risk management is the risk mitigation. Studies have revealed that it is 
impossible to abolish risk from WirelessHART network system.  Risk mitigation objectives at 
prioritizing, evaluating and implementing the needed risk reducing control policies. System and 
organizational managers may use numerous possibilities to reduce the risk to a system (Bowen, 
Hash, & Wilson, 2007). These options are risk assumption; risk avoidance; risk limitation; risk 
planning, research, and acknowledgement; and risk transference.  
 
                      Figure 10 Risk Mitigation strategy (Bowen, Hash, & Wilson, 2007) 
4.6 Data Security 
The main reason for security features associated with privacy is to minimize eavesdropping by an 
unsolicited device inside or outside the network. A WirelessHART sensor network (WSN) 
employs end-to end CCM mode 128-bit AES encryption at both network and transport layers for 
every message in the network (FieldComm Group, 2018). A common network key is distributed 
among all devices on a network for broadcast activity. Encryption keys can be rotated as dictated 
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by plant security policy to offer an even higher level of protection. During the joining process a 
128-bit join encryption key is applied to keep data sent and received private. Data security features 
associated with integrity ensures data sent and received over the wireless sensor network is the 
same and has not been changed. Data integrity ensures packets received has been authenticated 
and from the correct source.  
• WirelessHART uses two Message Integrity Check (MIC) Fields that are added to each 
packet 
• At the session layer, the receiving device uses the session MIC along with the protected 
data to confirm that the content of the packet has not been tampered. 
• At the link layer a separate MIC protect network routing information to prevent attacks 
that attempt to change the packet´s network/transport layer information. 
 
                               Figure 11 Data Security of WirelessHART (FieldComm Group, 2018) 
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4.7 Network Security 
Network security is very important in WirelessHART sensor network. Many attackers within and 
from outside will try to attack the network. These attackers will try as much as possible to attack 
the network by inserting trojan horse devices, impersonating network to get vital information 
from devices and causing the network to function properly as expected leading to denying of 
important services.  An attacker attacking the network can be from insider example an employee 
and from external. Good network security depends on techniques that support authentication, 
authorization, and threat sensing. According to the HART Communication Foundation these three 
points are crucial when it comes to network security in WirelessHART: 
• Before the network, the WirelessHART Gateway and the wireless sensors needs to be 
configured to control which devices are allowed permission to the network 
• For proper network security to be achieved all the devices in the wireless network should 
maintain their security status 
• WirelessHART Gateway has a secure validation procedure which it uses to negotiate with 
all joining devices to ensure they are authentic. As with all other network communications, 
all join negotiation traffic is encrypted end-to end. 
  
            Figure 12 Network Security of WirelessHART (FieldComm Group, 2018) 
 
4.8 Types of Attackers 
There are different types of attacker who may try to attack a network at a time. These attackers 
are grouped according to the types of attackers and the damages they cause to network and the 
45 
 
 
kind tools with which they attack. The attacker could be a passive, or an active and in some cases 
both.  
Passive Attacker: The passive attacker is the who does not cause serious damage to the network. They 
keep tracking of the network and tries to eavesdrop on the network but do not really make any changes 
to data or dropping any of the transmitted data.  
The key goals and effect of this attacker includes (FieldComm Group, 2018): 
• Eavesdropping 
• Gather and stealing information 
• Change privacy and confidentiality requirements 
• Make sure the WSN does not work well 
• Network partition by non-cooperate operations 
• Storing energy by selfish node and avoid from cooperation 
Active Attacker: These attackers takes actively part of the attack and in the end cause serious 
damages in the form of changing and modifying data. This can also change communication protocols 
and thereby introduce latency within the network, where it can have serious effect on area of 
application where WSNs are used. The active attacker always tries to insert faulty data into the 
network, impersonating, data modification, creating a hole in the security protocols (Mohammadi & 
Jadidoleslamy, 2011). 
The main goals and effects of this attacker includes: 
• Make sure the WSN is malfunctioning 
• Make sure WSN performance is degraded 
• Sensor nodes destruction 
• Data modification or changes 
• Preventing the operation or cut off certain nodes from their neighbours 
Insider attacker: An insider attacker has little or no knowledge about the network. They apply brute 
force to get information about the network and d its architecture. 
The main goals of this attackers include (Mohammadi & Jadidoleslamy, 2011): 
• Make sure they get access to cryptography keys or other codes 
• Make sure secrete keys opens to public 
• Partial, total degradation or disruption  
• To make sure the system functionality and efficiency is attacked  
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Outsider Attacker: This attacker most cases have all information about the network they attack. 
They normally have access to some or all part of the network. Based on the level of access or 
information partial or fully, they obtain knowledge about the network. 
The main goals of this attacker include (Mohammadi & Jadidoleslamy, 2011): 
• Jamming the whole communication of the WSN 
• Triggering Denial of Service (DoS) attacks 
• WSN resources consumption 
Mote class: This kind of attacker uses devices that look like common sensor nodes. This attacker in 
this case has access to nodes or motes that look just as the nodes in the WSN and maybe used to 
compromise one of the network nodes. These attackers execute malicious codes or programs to the 
WirelessHART network (Mohammadi & Jadidoleslamy, 2011). 
The main goals of Mote-class attacker include (Mohammadi & Jadidoleslamy, 2011): 
• They are responsible for jamming the radio link 
• Stealing and getting access to the cryptography keys 
Laptop Class Attacker: This attacker is like the mote class attacker. This attacker uses the laptop to 
attack the network. Because of the nature of powerful devices, they use they have access to high 
bandwidth and low-latency communication channel. These enemy creates traffic jam on the network 
and attempts to substitute genuine nodes with illegal ones (Mohammadi & Jadidoleslamy, 2011). 
The main goal of Laptop-class attacker includes: 
• Jamming the radio links on the network 
• Creating more serious attack on the network causing more damages to the network 
• Getting access to high bandwidth and low-latency communication channel  
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Attack category/ 
Features 
Type Damage level Ease of identify Attacker presence 
Based on damage 
level 
Active attacker High Easy Explicit 
Passive attacker Low Hard Implicit 
Based on attacker 
location 
External(outsider) Low Medium Implicit 
Internal(insider) High Hard Implicit 
Based on attacking 
devices 
Mote-class attacker Low Hard Implicit 
Laptop-class attacker High Easy Explicit 
Based on attack 
function 
Secrecy High Hard Implicit 
Availability High Hard Both 
Stealthy High Hard Implicit 
 Table 10. Threat model of WSNs (Mohammadi & Jadidoleslamy, 2011). 
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5 CHAPTER 5 
5.1 WirelessHART THREAT/ATTACKS 
There are different kinds of threat the WirelessHART sensor network must deal with due to the nature 
of network. The threat can be attributed to the size of communication nodes on the network.  A threat 
happens when an attacker tries to get very important information from the wireless network. When 
an attacker attacks a network there some essentials properties that includes (Mohammadi & 
Jadidoleslamy, 2011): Asset under attack, Actor (what or who breaches security), product of the 
security attack, and motive (intentional or unintentional). The asset of a WirelessHART sensor 
network can be data stored in a device or information that run through the network. The main aim of 
an attacker on it prey is to leak very important information, data modifications, and disruption of 
smooth network traffic (Raza S. , 2010).  The attack on the network has been grouped based on the 
network layers they exist.  The network layers include the Physical layer (PHY), Data link layer 
(DLL) and the network (routing) layer. 
5.2 PHY Layer Threat 
The physical layer threat is attributed to the wireless nature of communication inside the WSN. An 
attacker with the right equipment can easily eavesdrop and tries to get some secrete information from 
the network. Some of the physical layer attacks includes Denial of Service (DoS), Jamming, Physical 
tampering, Interference, Sybil. 
 
5.3 Denial of Service (DoS) 
In this attack the attacker tries to use all possible mean to prevent the nodes from properly functioning 
well, (Murty, Namboothiri, & Sivalingam, 2010). They try to block or jammed all resources such as 
frequency being used for transmission. This attack occurs when the attacker finds security lapses in 
software design.  They make nodes are required to function to their outmost level and to keep the 
network working are made useless.   
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5.4 Jamming 
Jamming is a situation where the attacker tries to obstruct the network by transmitting on the same 
wavelength used by the WirelessHART sensor network the same time the nodes within the network 
are transmitting, (Murty, Namboothiri, & Sivalingam, 2010).  When network uses the same frequency 
for transmission it causes disturbances or disruption to the network. When some of the routing 
protocols for WSNs, uses frequency hopping, the attacker just needs to know the hopping sequence 
of the protocol. This threat can be corrected applying spread-spectrum for transmission within the 
network. This type of attack aims to disturb the network by transmitting on the same frequency being 
used by WSN at the same time the nodes within the network are transmitting, (Murty, Namboothiri, 
& Sivalingam, 2010). It is also known to be an intentional interruption of radio signal when 
intentionally introducing noise or signals with same frequency and modulation technique as used in 
the target network (Raza S. , 2010). Disruption within the network is easily achieved if the network 
uses a single frequency for transmission. WirelessHART is more vulnerable to jamming attacks then 
interference; the attacker only needs to introduce radio signals using Bluetooth devices like cell 
phones and laptops.  WirelessHART introduces the concept of channel Blacklisting. In 
WirelessHART channel Blacklisting is network-wide and is done by a network administrator 
manually. Blacklisting improves the reliability of the WirelessHART network and same time limits 
the number of channels the device can use to send or receive traffic. If frequency hopping is used in 
the WirelessHART, then the attacker only needs to learn the hopping sequence of the protocol.  
 Despite Frequency-hopping spread spectrum and 15 available channels, the active attacker can jam 
the WirelessHART network.  A possible solution used in this situation is to employs the services of 
spread-spectrum for transmission within the network. 
 
5.5 Tampering 
 Tampering is because of the isolation of nodes in the WSNs.  Tampering is very serious as the 
isolated nodes comes under intense pressure from the attacker to the point of been compromised and 
in some cases destroyed totally. The focus of the attacker in this case is to make some changes to the 
hardware and get access to sensitive information like cryptography keys. To make sure this kind of 
threat is eradicated security measures that make sure the nodes are tamper-proof are implemented. 
Another is to ensure that on probation, nodes can self-erase (Raza S. , 2010). 
5.6 Interference 
Interference is an unintentional disturbance of radio signal. WirelessHART operates at 2450 (2400-
2483.5) MHz frequency band spectrum and has 16 channels and each channel´s bandwidth is 5 MHz. 
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WirelessHART share same spectrum with Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and ZigBee. Applying Frequency 
Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS), time diversity, and path diversity helps in eradicating 
interference. Process automation system requires fail proof (100%) reliability of the wireless medium, 
failure may produce very bad results (Raza S. , 2010).  
 
5.7 Sybil Attack 
In this attack the attacker can hold different identities. The main objectives of this attacker are to 
obtain the identity of any of the nodes to be used within the network. The attacker could also create 
an identity for the nodes to be used within the network (Messai, 2014). Because there is no trusted 
central authority in the traditional wireless ad hoc and sensor network, the chances of the attacker to 
have multiple identities is high (Raza S. , 2010). This attack is so possible if the attacker is an insider, 
since the attacker already has full knowledge about the network. The attacker creates different kinds 
of identities with the intention of using them to create virtual nodes known as Sybil nodes (Yang, 
Tarng, Hsieh, & Chen, 2010). After creating these virtual nodes, the attacker then uses it to perform 
any kinds of attack on the network. In this situation the attacker makes it possible for all the identities 
created to communicate within the network at the same time, (Murty, Namboothiri, & Sivalingam, 
2010). In cases like Data fragmentation and replication mechanisms employs as security some WSN 
ineffective as Sybil nodes has the identities of the original nodes within the network. For this attack 
to be prevented the Network Manager in the WirelessHART allocate a unique Nickname to all the 
devices connected to the network, and a unique ID which is unique for the device globally. The 
Gateway and the Network Manager maintains the list of Unique IDs and Nicknames respectively in 
the WirelessHART network.  The wireless devices use these Unique IDs and the Nicknames to 
maintain sessions with the Gateway and Network manager respectively. With all these in place sybil 
attack in the WirelessHART network in unsuccessful (Raza S. , 2010). 
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                                Figure 13Sybil Attack Process (Raza S. , 2010) 
 
      
           Figure 14 Sybil attack (Yang, Tarng, Hsieh, & Chen, 2010) 
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                     Figure 15 Sybil attack (Yang, Tarng, Hsieh, & Chen, 2010) 
 
5.8 Collusion 
   Wireless collusion is because of two or more devices trying to access the same frequency at the 
same time. In situation like this it could be a planned or unplanned.  Collusion can be minimized by 
merging of time and frequency diversity and CRC-16 is used to detect the collusion in the 
WirelessHART network. Schedule data transmission based on time slotting is very in the 
WirelessHART protocol to reduce the possibility of collusion. Time Division Multiple Access 
(TDMA) and channel hopping used to control access to the network. Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) 
is used in detecting collusion based on ITU-T polynomial. The CRC-16 is not always guaranteed to 
have knowledge about the insertion attack. This attack can be totally eradicated or prevented by 
application and active coordination between the physical and Data-link layer (Raza S. , 2010).  
5.9 Spoofing 
In communication network all the devices are required to use a well-known key. This key is not only 
for joining the network but also for the advertisement. The attacker can spoof the new join by 
dispatching wrong advertisement and upon receiving the join request it can simply ignore it. The new 
device cannot join the network because if the spoofing device is closer to the device joining the 
network. In spoofing attack, the attacker alters or replayed routing information, in this situation when 
a routing protocols are not in used fall prey in this type of attack. When the attacker has the possibility 
of performing alteration, and replaying routing information then the attacker could create routing 
loops, attract or repel network traffic, change source roots, create false error messages, increase 
latency and more (Murty, Namboothiri, & Sivalingam, 2010) (Karlof & Wagner, 2003). If the 
lookalike device possesses a valid network key, then spoofing attack will be more dangerous and can 
lead to serious blockage of network traffic. 
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5.10 Exhaustion 
Exhaustion is a situation where the attacker consumes all the resources energy of the victim node, by 
trying to do calculations or receiving data or sometimes transmitting data (Messai, 2014).    
With devices that supports the WirelessHART protocol stack and has information about unsecure 
WirelessHART network parameters can send messages to the WirelessHART devices using a well-
known key. Fake devices that have join the network uses the well-known key to calculate the MIC 
over the DLPDU and use the fake join key they have acquired to encrypted and validate the NPDU. 
Even though the messages that are sent are neglected by the Network Manager it drains network 
resources along the route from the field device to the network Manager (Raza S. , 2010). 
5.11 Wormhole Attack 
In the Wormhole attack the attacker tries to establish a tunnel between two genuine devices by making 
them communicate through a stronger wireless link or wired link (Messai, 2014). The HART devices 
that are connected to the WirelessHART network through adapters are the most subjected to 
wormhole attack by the attacker. By using the maintenance port of the two field devices, the attack 
creates a tunnel between these devices. When the Network key and the session key are compromised 
then a tunnel is established. In this attack multi-hop protocols, which are built-in the WirelessHART 
architectures, is the reason that makes this attack possible. In this attack the attacker usually uses two 
compromised nodes, these nodes seem to have the shortest hop route to the destination which is 
always the base station or the master node (Messai, 2014). These two nodes are far from each other 
in the network and data sent through this route may be dropped on the node receiving the data. If the 
WirelessHART employs graph routing technique then it has a high risk of been subjected to wormhole 
attack, but if Source routing is employed the device must use device-by-device route from source to 
destination. With regards to the source routing when any of the intermediate links fail the packet will 
be lost making it provide little defence against wormhole but not reliable one. Packet leaching is the 
best defence mechanism to wormhole attack (Raza S. , 2010). 
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                            Figure 16 Wormhole attack (Ould Amara, Beghdad, & Oussalah, 2013) 
 
From the figure above shows the attacker (WH) builds a tunnel between E and I.  
5.12 De-synchronization 
De-synchronization attack is a situation where the attacker can interrupt the exchange of information 
between two nodes by introducing distorted timing information in the network and making the 
devices to waste their resources in time synchronization (Raza et al. 2010). Timing is an essential 
requirement when it comes to WirelessHART network and the Timer is known to be one of the 
important modules in the WirelessHART. The timer module in the WirelessHART network is 
required to meet timing requirement to keep the time slots (10ms) in synchronization. Time slotting 
is the responsibility of the Medium access control (MAC) sub-layers. Anytime a node gets an 
acknowledgement message from its time source, it modifies its clock.  A sender can be a timing 
source for a node and if the sender corrupted it can interrupt the timing between the two nodes and 
the nodes taking active role are forced to waste their resources in synchronization (Raza S. , 2010). 
 
5.13 Selective Forwarding Attack 
Selective forwarding attack is because of the attacker taking advantage of the weakness of the multi-
hop technique of forwarding packet within the WirelessHART network. The corrupted node in the 
network will not forward all packets and some packets will be selectively dropped (Messai, 2014). 
Packet dropped in this situation are haphazardly chosen based on the inclination of the attacker 
attacking the network. The attacker’s inclination in this situation is based on what is contain in the 
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packets, the address of the forwarding node, or some random algorithm. In this attack when the node 
is not sending any packet and create a black hole, but usually the node selectively ignores packets so 
that it regarded as valid which could not be recognized by the recovering procedures.  This attack is 
more intense if it supported by a proper traffic analysis (Raza S. , 2010). 
 
 
                                Figure 17 Selective Forwarding (Ould Amara, Beghdad, & Oussalah, 2013) 
 
From the fig above in the (i) situation S which is the source node forwards data packets D1, D2, D3, 
D4 to node A, and when A received these packet forwards them to node B. The attacker in this case 
node AD the selectively sends packets D1, and D3 to node B and drops D2, and D4. In the (ii) case 
the attacker AD can decide to selectively drop packet from one source and then forward packet of 
others. Selective forwarding attack can be prevented by adopting multiple-path to send data and get 
information about mischievous node or suspect that it has failed and then look for another path (Ould 
Amara, Beghdad, & Oussalah, 2013). 
 
5.14 Traffic Analysis 
The Network Layer Protocol Data Unit (NPDU) header and the Data-Link layer Protocol Data Unit 
(DLPDU) are not protected and the attacker can easily get information on the WirelessHART traffic. 
The NPDU header fields which is made up of source address, destination address, security control 
byte, ANS snippet, and Nonce counter are all sent in clear. The DLPDU fields which are made up of 
fields like Address Specifier, Address, and DLPDU Specifier are sent in clear. These fields give other 
competing for same objectives enough information to allow analysis of the network (Raza S. , 2010). 
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5.15 Misdirection Attack 
In this attack the attacker’s main target for attack is the number of hops. In the network design, those 
with the shortest path are favoured because it reduces latency in the network to the lowest. In this 
attack tries to compromise a node on the network and then uses the node to change the path of any 
packet that are to be sent to another node that is far away from the intended destination. This situation 
brings about inactivity in the network and tries to stop packet from ever getting to the destination. 
The more nodes a network contain the more vulnerable they are to this attack. 
5.16 HELLO flood Attack 
In this form of attack protocols make sure that nodes sent HELLO packets to all other nodes in the 
network to start all interaction among the communicating nodes. Laptop class attacker is one of the 
uses the HELLO flood attack (Karlof & Wagner, 2003). Protocols that use the hello packets are made 
to believe that receiving those packets show the sender is in close radio range, and therefore they are 
meant to believe they are neighbours. Uses of a highly developed powered transmitter by the attacker 
to deceive wide area of nodes that they are neighbours of that transmitting node. These deceived 
nodes are made to send information to the attacker rather than the base station. In the figure below 
AD the attacker’s node sends a hello packet deceiving the nodes in the network that they are its 
neighbours (Messai, 2014). The (AD) makes I, H, F which are far from it are deceived into believing 
that they are closer and neighbours and try to send packets through it and in the process losing date 
and wasting energy too. To prevent this attack from occurring, a mechanism known as authentication 
by third node is employed. 
   
 Figure 18 HELLO flood attack (Ould Amara, Beghdad, & Oussalah, 2013) 
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5.17 Sinkhole Attack 
In this form of attack, the attacker makes sure compromised nodes looks beautiful to nodes around 
by forging routing information. The nodes around are more likely to choose the compromised nodes 
as the next node to route their packet through. Sinkhole attack is an upgrade of blackhole attack.  With 
regards to the blackhole attack, the attacker compromise nodes inside the network and drops all data 
that are routed through it. This compromised node is unnoticed because it keeps transmitting packet 
it has generated by itself to the next hop, (Murty et al. 2010). The network administrator is deceived 
into believing that nodes that used the compromised node as the next hop are unresponsive. The 
sinkhole attacker takes advantage of this situation by advertising to be the shortest path to the master 
node or base station. The sinkhole attack drops large amount of data compared to the blackhole attack. 
The sinkhole attack makes selective forwarding easier, since all traffic from big area in the network 
passes through the attacker´s node (Ould Amara, Beghdad, & Oussalah, 2013). The figure below is 
an example of Sinkhole attack. 
  
 Figure 19 Sinkhole Attack (Ould Amara, Beghdad, & Oussalah, 2013) 
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OSI Layer Security Threat General WirelessHART defense Mechanism 
 
 
Physical 
Interference Channel hopping and Blacklisting 
Jamming Channel hopping and Blacklisting 
Sybil Physical Protection of WirelessHART devices 
Tampering Protection and Changing of Network Key 
 
 
 
Data-link 
Collusion CRC and Time Diversity 
Exhaustion Protection of Network ID and other information that required to 
joining device 
Spoofing Use different path for re-sending the message 
Sybil Regularly changing of Network key 
De-Synchronization Using different neighbours for time synchronization  
Traffic Analysis Sending of dummy packet in quite hours; and regular monitoring 
WirelessHART network using Handhelds etc 
Eavesdropping Network Key protects DLPDU from Eavesdropper 
 
 
Network 
Wormhole Physical monitoring of field devices and regular monitoring of 
network using source routing 
Monitoring system may use Packet Leash Technique 
Selective forward Regular network checking using Source Routing 
DOS Protection of Network specific data like Network ID etc. Physical 
protection and checking of network 
Sybil Resetting of devices and changing session key 
Traffic Analysis Sending of dummy packet in quite hours; and regularly checking 
WirelessHART network using Handhelds etc 
Eavesdropping Session key protect NPDU from Eavesdroppers 
 Table 11  Attacks on wireless portion of Wireless of WirelessHART (Raza S. , 2010) 
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Security Threat               Defense Mechanism 
 
Spoofing 
 
Implementation of security in core network and excellent architecture of 
gateway 
 
Masquerading 
 
Use of PKI in the core network will eliminate this issue if carefully 
implemented 
 
Interference/Jamming 
Better to use Wired medium between Network Manager and Gateway (but 
wireless link can be provided for redundancy and hence reliability). The 
redundant device can minimize this problem 
 
DOS 
Eliminating illegal access to the legal network, proper monitoring and 
administration of network (There is no definite solution against DOS attack) 
 
Eavesdropping 
 
          Physical protection of wires (OR Wi-Fi using WPA/RSN) 
 
Social Engineering 
 
Protection of device and network secrets such as password through 
education and reminders. 
      Table 12 Attack on Core/wired portion of WirelessHART (Raza S. , 2010) 
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6 CHAPTER 6 
6.1 CRYTOGHRAPIC SOLUTION 
The method used in protecting or secure a wireless or wired communication from an attacker is called 
Cryptography. In this process is in two forms; firstly plain text which is the original set of text that 
are to be changed in a way that the attacker is not able to understand are converted in to cipher text 
known as encryption and then from cipher text which is the end-product of any changes made to the 
plain text, this is made up of the characters on the plain text, but totally different because of some 
algorithm the sender and receiver have put in place which is changed back to plain text is known as 
decryption. This method of securing the communication protocol is made up of two type; the 
symmetric encryption and asymmetric or public key cryptography (PKC). 
   
6.2 Symmetric Encryption 
In the symmetric encryption method, the sender and receiver employ the use of shared secret key or 
encryption or decryption algorithm in their communication for encryption and decryption. 
Symmetric encryption methods 
• Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
• Triple DES (3DES). 
• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). 
The Data Encryption Standard was the cryptosystem been used until it was broken in July 1998 using 
DES cracker (Stallings, 2011). This led into the introduction of the Triple DES, that is implementing 
the DES three times.  In 2001 the National Institute of Standard and Technology approved the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Stallings, 2011). 
Asymmetric Encryption Method (PKC) 
• Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA). 
• Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). 
• ElGamal Cryptosystem. 
With key sharing now becoming not very secured the idea of PKC was brought in a way to secure 
the system from attack. The keys used must always has to be private and the distribution of these 
keys must be secret can be complex when taking into consideration the types of attacks on the 
system. According to Stalling William RSA is widely used PKC system (Stallings, 2011).  
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6.3 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
According to Stalling the advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a block cipher that employ the 
use of 128-bit block size and 128, 192, or 256 bits of key (Stallings, 2011). The algorithm of the 
AES works in Number of Rounds (Nr), and the design of one round consist of two different data-
paths, namely the decryption data-path and inverse key scheduling data-path (Madduri & 
Jonnalagadda, 2012).  
AES algorithm is made of three main parts; Cipher, Inverse cipher and key expansion. Cipher 
changes data into cryptic form known as ciphertext, whiles inverse cipher convert data back into 
its main form called plain text. The key expansion is the one responsible for generating key for 
scheduling that are used in cipher and inverse cipher (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012).  In the 
AES, a single round is made up of four different functions which are byte substitution, 
permutation, arithmetic operation over a finite field and XOR operation with a key. AES 
operations are done using 8-bit bytes. Arithmetic operations of addition, multiplication and 
division are all done using finite field known as Galois Field GF (28).  The AES algorithm uses 
ten rounds which is made of four different stages.  
 
• Substitute bytes  
• Shift Rows  
• Mixed Columns  
• Add Round Key  
 
6.4 Encryption Process 
This process is made up of four different stages namely sub byte, shift row, mix column and add 
round key. These stages are applied consecutively over the data block bits, in a fixed number of 
iterations called rounds. In the encryption process the length of the key determines the number of 
rounds. From table 12 below its shows that when the user uses 128-bit key the number of rounds 
are 10. In 192-bit, the number of rounds is 12 and if the key length is 256-bit, then the number of 
rounds is 14 (Vanishreeprasad & Pushpalatha, 2015). 
. 
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     Figure 20 Encryption and Decryption Process (Stallings, 2011) 
 6.4.1 Sub Byte  
In the substitute bytes process the use of an S-box to undergo byte to byte substitution of the 
block. Byte in the matrix are substituted with a sub byte using data from the Rijndael S-box 
(Vanishreeprasad & Pushpalatha, 2015). The process is much explained in the figure below. 
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               Figure 21 Sub-byte (Vanishreeprasad & Pushpalatha, 2015) 
6.4.2 Shift Row 
 The shift Row process is the only process where permutation is done in the AES. In this process 
a periodic shift of the bytes in each row by certain offset to the left. For AES, there is no change 
on the first row. On the second row each byte is moved by one to the left. On the third is moved 
by two and on the fourth row is moved by three (Vanishreeprasad & Pushpalatha, 2015). 
 
 
               Figure 22 Shift Row (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012) 
6.4.3 Mix Column 
This is a process of substitution that uses arithmetic of GF (28). In this process each column is 
performed separately. Individual byte of column is mapped into a new value that will be function 
of all four bytes in the column. The sum of products of elements of one row and one column 
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becomes the product matrix. The addition and multiplication in this process are done by using the 
Galois Field (28) (Vanishreeprasad & Pushpalatha, 2015). 
 
 
                        Figure 23 Mix Column (Vanishreeprasad & Pushpalatha, 2015) 
6.4.4 Add Round Key   
This is a bitwise XOR of the current block with a portion of the key which has been expanded 
before. In this process the XOR operation is done between the output from the Mix column and 
the Round Key (Vanishreeprasad & Pushpalatha, 2015) 
 
 
 Block size (Nb) 
Words 
Key length (Nk) 
Words 
Number of Rounds 
(Nr) 
AES-128 Bits key 4 4 10 
AES- 192 Bits key 4 6 12 
AES- 256 bits key 4 8 14 
                        Table 13 Types of Key Sizes (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012) 
The table shown above, shows that the number of rounds depends on the size of the AES key. 128-
bit key is divided into 4X4 matrix which individual element contains 8 bits. When it comes to 192-
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bit size, it is split into 6X6 matrix with individual element of 8bits. For the 256-bit size it is split into 
8X8 with individual element of 8bits.  
 
6.5 Decryption Process 
The decryption process is the direct opposite of the encryption process. In this process all the four 
stages in the encryption process are inversely applied to this process. In this process the last rounds 
values of the encryption process become the first-round inputs values for the Decryption process. 
The four stages of the Decryption process namely Inverse sub byte transformation, Inverse Shift 
Row Transformation, Inverse Mix Column Transformation, and Inverse Add round Key 
Transformation will be discussed in detail. 
 
6.5.1 Inverse Sub Byte Transformation 
The inverse Sub Byte transformation is the direct opposite of the Sub byte in the encryption 
process. In this process each byte in the cipher matrix is changed with a corresponding inverse 
sub byte (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
              
 
  Figure 24  AES Specified Inverse Substitution Matrix (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012) 
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6.5.2 Inverse Shift Row Transformation 
In this process bytes are shifted in same mode as in the encryption process but to the right. The 
first row remains unchanged. Byte in the second row is shifted by one to the right, third row is 
shifted by two, and fourth row is shifted by three (Vanishreeprasad & Pushpalatha, 2015). 
 
                  
 
   Figure 25  Inverse Shift Row Transformation (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
 
6.5.3 Inverse Mix Column Transformation 
The Inverse Mix Column transformation in the decryption process is the inverse of the mix 
column in the encryption process. Though this process is done same way as the Mix column but 
with different values in the matrix. 
 
 
                            Figure 26 Inverse Mix Column Transformation (Madduri & Jonnalagadda, 2012). 
 
6.5.4 Inverse Add Round Key Transformation 
The inverse Add Round Key Transformation is the inverse of the Add Round Key in the 
encryption process.  
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
In concluding my thesis work on WirelessHART compared to other wireless technologies. 
WirelessHART has a wide range of advantages over other wireless technologies ranging from power 
consumption, cost effective, data security, network security, reliability, fault finding and diagnose, 
time saving, easy to use, real time update, wide reach and availability and environmentally friendly.  
 
Security: When it comes to security the WirelessHART provides end-to end, per-hop, and peer- to-
peer security. WirelessHART uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for encryption and 
decryption to secure the communication network against inside and outside attackers.  
 
Cost: WirelessHART is said to be less expensive as compared to the wire HART. The cost involve 
in WirelessHART installation is cheaper than that of wired HART. With wired HART cable 
installation is either underground or overhead which requires more funding and time. 
 
Installation: WirelessHART installation is simple, time saving and less expensive. 
 
Fault finding and diagnoses: Fault finding in WirelessHART can easily be detected and diagnose by 
network manager or technician.  
 
Time saving: Because installation in WirelessHART is simple and fast it saves lot of time.  
 
Reliability: WirelessHART is more reliable than other wireless technologies due to redundant of 
communication path. 
 
Mobility: WirelessHART is mobile as its work in the entire wireless network coverage area. 
 
During my thesis work I came across few shortcomings in WirelessHART security as discuss below: 
a. There is no definite public key cryptography 
b. There is no path redundancy in the wired part of the network 
c. There is no clear connection between the Gateway and the Network manager. 
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d. WirelessHART does not administer and stipulate security mechanisms to protect the link 
between the security Manager and Network manager. 
e. The network integration between the WirelessHART and the HART is not definite. 
f. There is no existing security protection between the Gateway and host application 
g. Broadcast communication between field devices is not reinforced. 
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